Formalhardware veri cation based on symbolic trajectory evaluation shows considerable promise in verifying medium to large scale VLSI designs with a high degree of automation. However, in order to verify today's designs, a method for composing partial veri cation results is needed. One way of accomplishing this is to use a general purpose theorem prover to combine the verication results obtained by other tools. However, a specialised purpose theorem prover is more attractive since it can more easily exploit symbolic trajectory evaluation (and may be easier to use). Consequently we explore the possibility of developing a much simpler, but more tailor made, theorem prover designed speci cally for combining veri cation results based on trajectory evaluation. In the paper we discuss the underlying inference rules of the prover as well as more practical issues regarding the user interface. We nally conclude with a couple of examples in which we are able to verify designs that could not have been veri ed directly. In particular, the complete veri cation of a 64 bit multiplier takes approximately 15 minutes on a Sparc 10 machine.
Introduction
The veri cation of computer systems has become more important as computer systems grow in complexity and range of use. Veri cation | the proving under some mathematical theory of the existence (or non-existence) of properties in the system | comes at a cost: it is a di cult and computationally intensive task. Although signi cant advances have been made, all veri cation methods su er from this problem in some way. This paper presents a new technique based on trajectory evaluation which reduces the computational cost of veri cation in many cases. In this section, we present background material, and introduce and motivate the new method.
Hardware Veri cation
The theory of all the veri cation methods discussed in this paper applies equally to software and hardware systems. However, the application of the theory has been more successful with hardware than software since the regular nature of design and the small number of types of components makes veri cation of hardware systems in general more tractable than more general systems.
A survey of the large number of di erent hardware veri cation techniques which have been proposed is beyond the scope of this paper (an introduction to the topic and a good set of references to the topic can be found in (McFarland, 1993) ). The work presented here draws on three techniques.
1. Theorem proving: Theorem-provers are based on formal systems such as logic. For hardware veri cation, both the speci cation and implementation can be described in logic, and the task of verifying the system is to prove that the implementation entails the speci cation. One of the best known theorem-provers is the HOL system (Gordon, 1993) , with which theories of di erent sorts can be built up in a rigorous way using a small number of primitive axioms and inference rules. The key advantage of the approach is that the proof that the implementation entails the speci cation can be checked mechanically. We can also have a high degree of con dence in the soundness of a system like HOL due to the small number of primitive axioms and inference rules. Another important advantage of theorem proving is that it can be used to argue at di erent levels of abstraction. Theorem proving is structural rather than behavioural, so that we can use the structure of the system to manage the complexity. Unfortunately, structure may not always be present in a system in the required degree (for example, optimisation of a circuit may transform a circuit with a high degree of structure into one with a low degree of structure).
The most signi cant disadvantage of theorem proving by itself is that it can be extremely tedious to verify certain properties, particularly low-level properties of circuits. Unless simpli cations are made, this approach can be very expensive. Besides HOL, there are a number of well-known theorem-provers, including PVS (Owre et al., 1992) and the Boyer-Moore system (Boyer & Moore, 1988) , 2. Model checking: In model checking, the behaviour of the system is described by some model (for example, a Kripke structure, a nite state machine, expressions in a process algebra like CCS). The desired properties of a system are expressed in some logic (for example, CTL, the modal -calculus) (Clarke et al., 1983; Cleaveland et al., 1989; Coudert et al., 1990; Burch et al., 1992) . A model checking algorithm can be used to check whether the model satis es such an expression. Depending on how restricted the model is (the state space of the model can be very large | even in nite), and the language we are allowed to write the logical expressions, model checking can be e cient. There are important limitations to what can be checked e ciently (as an example the data path of a circuit poses a computational challenge). Furthermore, while it may be very convenient to write expressions in a logic, it is not always clear that the collection of properties actually veri ed is what we want to verify. Model checking is based on the behavioural rather than structural properties of the system. Many recent model-checking algorithms use ordered binary-decision diagrams (OBDDs or BDDs) (Bryant, 1992) for the e cient manipulation of boolean expressions. One of the advantages of BDDs is that boolean expressions have canonical forms which makes comparison of expressions very e cient. Although BDDs do have practical limitations, the use of BDDbased method has extended by orders of magnitude the size of systems that can be tackled by model-checkers. 3. Trajectory Evaluation: If the state space of a system (for example a circuit) is a lattice, the behaviour of the system can be expressed as a trajectory, a sequence of points in the lattice determined by the initial state and the system functionality. Formulas in a simple temporal logic express properties of the circuit. Given a formula, we can derive bounds that trajectories with the desired property must obey. Symbolic trajectory evaluation e ciently checks whether all, or a speci ed class, of trajectories of the machine obey these bounds.
Generally it checks that all trajectories of a machine M which have property A also have property C. We write this as j = M A== C], and say that M satis es the trajectory assertion.
Trajectory evaluation has several advantages. Veri cation is behavioural rather than structural, and thus symbolic trajectory evaluation is suitable for systems such as optimised circuits. Very accurate models, including timing, of the underlying model can be used, which increases our con dence in the meaningfulness of the results obtained. Symbolic trajectory evaluation also uses BDDs as a powerful method of manipulating boolean expressions. A full description of trajectory evaluation is given in a later section. Although many circuits can be veri ed very e ciently, there are, however, some limitations. It is these limitations which have motivated this work. Introductory references for symbolic trajectory evaluation include (Beatty et al., 1991; Seger & Bryant, 1993 ).
Motivation
Although trajectory evaluation is a very successful approach for verifying many realistic circuits, two weaknesses have been noted of this method. First, there can be a semantic gap between the trajectory evaluation veri cation and what the user has in mind to verify. Part of the problem is that the proof is structured at the bit-level, when it may be more natural to represent the proof in terms of a higher-level domain, for example arguing about the behaviour of the circuit in terms of what it does to integers rather than bit-vectors. And, unlike with theorem-proving, we cannot exploit any form of structure to guide the proof.
Second, it is still computationally expensive and approaches that would reduce this cost would be useful. In particular, due to the underlying data representation techniques used in symbolic trajectory evaluation and the inability to decompose the proof, there are some types of circuits which are in practice unveri able using this approach solely | for example a multiplier circuit.
Our approach o ers a number of advantages. We believe that the compositional approach makes the veri cation easier for the user, particularly for very large systems. Second, verifying the individual components separately is much more e cient for a variety of reasons (discussed in later sections). Third, composing results using domain-information makes composition e cient and practical. Fourth, di erent techniques can be used for veri cation of parts of the system, and for veri cation as a whole, thereby exploiting the strengths of di erent veri cation approaches and overcoming their limitations.
As an example, consider the circuit in Figure 1 , which takes in three numbers x, y and z on nodes A, B and C and outputs max(x; y)+z on node F. The circuit comprises three major parts: a comparator, a selector, and an adder. Although this is a simple example which can easily be veri ed by symbolic trajectory evaluation alone, it can illustrate some of these ideas. Each component is separately veri ed (with the advantages mentioned above). The next step is to verify that the comparator combined with the selector produces the greater of the two input values. The nal step is to combine this with the adder to show the nal result is correct. The veri cation of each component is done in the presence of the rest of the system, which means that any unintended interference can be detected. We can easily show that no matter what the rest of the system does we shall obtain the desired behaviour. This is a very useful property, since much of the work involved in other compositional approaches goes into ensuring that each component works correctly in all environments.
This paper explores combining theorem-proving and trajectory evaluation so as to gain the bene ts of both approaches, and overcome the problems noted. An important objective in our work is to provide a practical tool without losing rigour.
The method that we propose is a theorem proving system in which the mathematical objects being manipulated are trajectory assertions. In later sections, the theory of trajectory evaluation and the theory of how they can be combined and manipulated will be discussed. Here we give a brief overview of theorem proving.
The work on theorem provers rst started in the late 1960s and early 1970s with the work of de Bruijn and Milner. The core of a theorem prover is a set of axioms and inference rules. Using only these, the user can prove a theorem, with the system mechanically checking each step in a proof. While good theorem provers have tools which assist a user in the derivation of a proof, automatic derivation of proofs is usually not their goal.
There are di erent ways in which this assistance can be given. Perhaps the most important part of the utility of these tools is the way in which they can interact with the user. In HOL, for example, the user can write proof scripts in ML. This programmability alleviates some of the tedium of theorem proving and makes the tool much more exible. In our tool too, the user has a fully programmable script language in which to specify proofs.
Proof management can also be accomplished with the use of what in HOL are called \tactics". This enables the decomposition of proofs: working backwards from the goal, the appropriate tactics are applied to the theorem to discover sub-results, which, if proven, can be used to prove the nal result. It should be stressed that skilful human intervention is critical. Using the proof script language in our system, it is possible to create similar building blocks.
A third type of assistance which can be provided is the use of external, non-trusted programs. For example, in HOL a theory of di erentiation has been built up. However, integration within HOL is extremely di cult, so one way of doing integration is to use a symbolic mathematics package to generate the answer. We do not trust this answer, however, because the result has not been proven within HOL. However, we can use di erentiation within HOL to check the answer (Harrison & Thery, 1993) .
We use these ideas in two ways. First, we use a simple auxiliary theorem prover about integers so as to incorporate domain knowledge. Secondly, our tool occasionally uses a heuristic to \guess" an answer, which is then automatically checked to see whether it is correct.
Outline
Our goal is to exploit the strengths of symbolic trajectory evaluation, to overcome some its weaknesses, and create a methodology for the composition and management of proof results.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes related work. In Section 3 , after the underlying theory of symbolic trajectory evaluation is described, an e cient method of performing trajectory evaluation is given. Section 4 describes the new theory | the rules of inference which allow the combination of symbolic trajectory evaluation results. Whereas symbolic trajectory evaluation is a purely behavioural method, for our new theory to be useful, it is important that some structure be readily identi able. However, we are not moving to a purely structural model since our method deals more with the composition of the speci cation and the proof than the composition of the underlying circuit. So although we need to be able to use some structure in our system, we have neither to build a structural model of the system, nor describe the behaviour of the component parts. Earlier we noted the limitations of symbolic trajectory evaluation with respect to the low-level of abstraction, and the limitations of the underlying data representation. Section 5 discusses how these problems can be overcome in a rigorous and practical way. Section 6 describes the practical veri cation tool developed using the theory described in the earlier sections. With this tool, we are able to use symbolic trajectory evaluation to perform partial veri cation, and the combinational theory to combine these results. Section 7 presents several examples, and section 8 is a conclusion.
Related Work
There are two important in uences on this work, compositionality and use of hybrid methods.
Compositionality
Compositionality is the divide-and-conquer approach of veri cation. It allows re-use of results and, most importantly, it greatly reduces the state space of systems that need to be explored. Since a human veri er is able to structure the veri cation, it makes veri cation easier to manage. Compositionality has been examined from a number of di erent aspects:-Process algebras such as CCS (Milner, 1989) and CSP (Brookes et al., 1984) have as one of their major advantages the ability to de ne and prove properties of programs and speci cation using compositionality. Work continues on making veri cation through compositionality more e cient in process algebras and more general transition systems (Larsen & Thomsen, 1991; Groote & Moller, 1992) In model checking approaches too, there has been work in using compositionality to control the state space of the system (Coudert et al., 1990; Clarke et al., 1989; Shiple et al., 1992; Long, 1993) . For theorem-provers, composition at a structural level is very important for e cient and easy veri cation. The use of di erent forms of logic promotes the ease of veri cation.
This work shows how symbolic trajectory evaluation results can be composed.
Hybrid Methods and Proof Management
By hybrid methods, we mean the combined use of di erent veri cation methods. Ad hoc hybrid approaches where designers use di erent techniques to verify and test di erent parts of the system and use informal argument to glue the pieces together is not new and very common. What we are aiming at is something of greater rigour. One of the rst systems which combined di erent approaches rigorously was the HOL-Voss system (Seger & Joyce, 1992) . The HOL theorem-prover and the Voss symbolic trajectory evaluation system were linked together in a formal, rigorous way. This enables the proof of something within one system to be carried over into the other system.
Although not a hybrid approach, the method of model-checking in nite state-spaces suggested by Brad eld illustrates the utility of providing a method of combining automatic veri cation and human-driven (but mechanically checked) veri cation (Brad eld, 1992) . Although very di erent from our work, the common theme is that a practical yet rigorous proof management system is very useful in veri cation.
Recent work by Kurshan and Lamport is much closer to our approach (Kurshan & Lamport, 1993) . They have combined the COSPAN model-checker with the TLP theorem prover. The model checker is used to prove properties of components of the system: these properties are then translated into a form suitable for the theorem-prover. In order to prove the overall result, a number of sub-results need to be proved (including a hand-checked step).
The common link between our approaches is the recognition that di erent techniques can be useful in di erent places to overcome the fundamental limitations of each individual approach. Beyond that it is di cult to compare our work since the two are very di erent. Some of the di erences and di culties in comparison are:
In our approach, all veri cation results are expressed and have meaning within the theory of symbolic trajectory evaluation. The theorem-prover allows e cient inference of some of these results, but we do not have to integrate one theory in another, or translate one formalism into another (mechanically or manually). Related to this is that we have one integrated tool for veri cation, and all steps are automatic or machine checked. We can verify circuits at a much lower-level than in the COSPAN/TLP approach. This makes our approach much less dependent on the structural properties of the system and its speci cation. It also means that we can capture the timing constraints very accurately 2 .
As for usability, we believe that our approach is much easier to understand, since the mathematics a user must understand is much simpler. Of course, this is a very subjective issue, and much can be dealt with by providing a pleasant user interface. No performance gures are given for the COSPAN/TLP veri cation of the 64-bit multiplier which means we cannot compare performance. Furthermore, attractive as the eeting glory of having the fastest 64-bit multiplier veri cation in the world may be, it is not clear that this is a useful benchmark | rather, it shows that a class of circuits unveri able using forms of model-checking alone are now quite tractable. Another recent proposal which combines model checking and theorem-proving is reported in (Hungar, 1993) . Here, the model is given by a Kripke structure representing the semantics of an Occam program, and the properties are expressed in terms of a variant of CTL. The results generated by model-checking are combined using the LAMBDA theorem-prover. Given an Occam program consisting of a number of processes, using the model-checker, properties can be proven of each process. A number of rules | some analogous to the ones we propose in Section 4 | can then be used by the theorem-prover to combine these sub-properties to prove properties of the entire program. The work was reported as work in progress, so it is di cult to evaluate this properly in relation to our work, but the motivation behind the work is similar to ours.
The Theory Behind Trajectory Evaluation
In this section we shall give a brief introduction to the theory behind symbolic trajectory evaluation. For the complete theory, the interested reader is referred to (Seger & Bryant, 1993) . We shall assume the reader has a working knowledge of elementary concepts from lattice theory. In particular, the concepts of partial orders, lattices, monotone functions, etc. will be used without further explanation.
The model we use of a system is simple and general. A model structure is a tuple M = hS; v i; Y ], where hS; v i is a complete lattice and Y is a monotone successor function Y : S ! S.
Intuitively, the successor function is used to express constraints on the sequence of states a system may go through. In other words, given that the system is in state s 2 S, we view Y (s) as denoting the least speci ed state the system can be in one time unit later. Here, \least speci ed" is de ned in terms of the partial order v . To illustrate the ideas introduced so far, consider the circuit shown in Fig. 2 . If we assume a unit delay model of the inverter, the state of the system consists of the value of the input and the current value of the output. Consequently, the lattice S shown in Fig. 3 can be used to model the circuit behaviour. Since the inverter cannot impose any restrictions on its input, it follows that the next state function will always be X for the input node, i.e., Y in (i; o) = X. For the output node, the next state function will be de ned as: The key to the e ciency of trajectory evaluation is the restricted language that can be used to phrase questions about the model structure. The basic speci cation language we use is very simple. Although at rst glance it might appear as if it can only be used to specify rather trivial behaviours, this is not the case, particularly as we later extend the model structure to a symbolic domain. This will essentially allow us to represent in a very concise and e cient way a very large set of cases simultaneously. By keeping the underlying logic simple, we gain some important properties. The most important is that there is a unique weakest trajectory that satis es a formula. By focusing initially on the scalar version, we avoid the added complexity of the symbolic case while building a foundation for this more general formulation.
Before describing trajectory formulas, we need to introduce the concept of a simple predicate. The truth semantics of a trajectory formula is de ned relative to a model structure and a trajectory. In particular, given a model structure M and a trajectory , the truth of a trajectory formula F, written j = M F, is de ned recursively. In the following, assume that both and 0~ are members of L(M).
1.
We can extend the de nition of simplicity from predicates to formulas in the obvious way, i.e., given a model structure M, a formula F is said to be simple i there is a de ning trajectory 2 L(M) such that j = M F i v . The main observation behind trajectory evaluation is that trajectory formulas are simple. In fact, we shall give a construction that given a trajectory formula F constructs the de ning sequence. The construction is direct and very e cient. As a result, if the main veri cation task can be phrased in terms of \for every trajectory that satis es the trajectory formula A, verify that the trajectory also satis es the formula C", it becomes obvious how the veri cation can be carried out: compute the de ning trajectory for the formula A and check that the formula C holds for this trajectory.
Before giving the construction, it is convenient to introduce an in x \choice" function mapping f0; 1g S ! to S ! and which is de ned as: In general, we have the following result.
Lemma 3.1 For any trajectory formula F let F be constructed as above. Then for every 2 L(M) j = M F () F v Proof: For a proof of this result, the reader is referred to (Seger & Bryant, 1993) .
From this lemma we know that any trajectory satisfying F must be greater than or equal to the de ning sequence F . Thus computing F and then determining if a trajectory is greater than or equal to F allows us to quickly test whether the trajectory satis es the formula F. However, F is not necessarily itself a trajectory, so we combine the constraints on a state sequence implied by F with those imposed by the system's next-state function to give a trajectory and show that the obtained trajectory is the weakest possible trajectory satisfying F. Lemma 3.2 Assume F is de ned as above, then:
1. F 2 L(M), 2. F j = M F, and 3. for every 2 L(M) j = M F () F v Proof: For a proof of this result, the reader is referred to (Seger & Bryant, 1993) .
The above lemmas give a simple method for computing the de ning trajectory and the de ning sequence for a trajectory formula. Although both the de ning trajectory and the de ning sequence are theoretically in nite sequences, it is easy to show that if F is a trajectory formula and F = 0 Our speci cation language describes a property of the system M as an assertion of the form A== C], where both A and C are trajectory formulas expressing constraints on the trajectory.
Unlike a trajectory formula, however, an assertion is considered to hold only if it holds for all trajectories. That is, A== C] holds, written j = M A== C], when for every 2 L(M) we have that j = M A implies that j = M C.
The following theorem forms the basis for veri cation based on trajectory evaluation. Theorem 3.3 Assume A and C are two trajectory formulas. Let A be the de ning trajectory for formula A and let C be the de ning sequence for formula C. Then j = M A== C] i C v A . Proof: Again, for a proof of this result the reader is referred to (Seger & Bryant, 1993 ).
There is one major drawback with the veri cation method suggested above|a single trajectory formula is not very expressive. In order to verify any non-trivial property of a system we would have to write down and verify a very large number of assertions. By making the formulas and algorithms above operate over a symbolic domain we can e ciently express and verify this set of assertions in a concise and e cient way. The key idea is to preserve the symbolic structure of the formulas in the veri cation algorithm. By doing so, we can perform the same algebraic manipulations and rather than obtaining a true/false answer, we shall obtain a Boolean function over some variables. This Boolean function, given a truth assignment to the Boolean variables, evaluates to 1 i the scalar assertion corresponding to this truth assignment holds.
More speci cally, let V be a set of symbolic boolean variables. For convenience, let B denote the set f0; 1g. An assignment, , is a mapping : V ! B assigning a binary value to each variable. Let be the set of all possible assignments, i.e., = f : V ! Bg. A domain constraint, D , de nes a restriction on the values assigned to the variables. We will denote such domain constraints by boolean expressions. That is, let E be a boolean expression over elements of V 3 . This expression de nes a Boolean mapping e: ! B and thus denotes the domain constraint D = f j e( ) = 1g.
The set of all assignments is denoted by the constant function _ 1. Expressing domain constraints by boolean expressions allows us to compactly specify many di erent circuit operating conditions with a single formula. 
There are several ways of extending trajectory formulas to the symbolic domain. The approach we have taken is very simple and consists simply of allowing the domain constraint to be an arbitrary boolean expression rather than only 1 or 0. For the case of circuit simulation, we also introduce the notation (n i is E) as a shorthand for the formula (E ! (n i is 1))^(E ! (n i is 0)). That is, we constrain node n i to have the particular symbolic Boolean value denoted by the expression E.
Given a symbolic trajectory formula _ F and an assignment 2 , the corresponding trajectory formula, written _ F( ), is de ned to be the trajectory formula obtained by replacing the Boolean expressions in the domain constraints with the value of the expression for this assignment.
Given the above, we can now derive a symbolic trajectory evaluation algorithm by simply extending the operators and functions used in the scalar trajectory evaluation algorithm to the symbolic domain. Thus, given a model structure M and a symbolic assertion h _ A== _ C i , the checking algorithm computes the Boolean function expressing the set of assignments under which the assertion is true. For most veri cation problems, this should simply be the constant function 1, i.e., the assertion should hold under all variable assignments. Again, for a more detailed discussion and proof of correctness of this result the reader is referred to (Seger & Bryant, 1993) .
The Voss System
The Voss system is a formal hardware veri cation system being developed at the University of British Columbia by the second author. Originally intended as a simple front-end for a symbolic trajectory evaluation system, the system has evolved signi cantly. In essence, the Voss system consists of three major components: a highly e cient implementation of Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams; an event driven symbolic simulator with very comprehensive delay and race analysis capabilities; and a general purpose, purely functional language. The language, called FL, is a strongly typed, polymorphic, and fully lazy language. Every object of type boolean in the system is internally represented as an OBDD. Consequently, FL is a very convenient language for developing prototype veri cation methodologies that require OBDD manipulations. Also, since the language supports abstract data types similar to ML (Milner, 1984) , the type system can bene cially be used to safeguard the implementation (Gordon et al., 1979) . In fact, we use exactly this feature in the system we describe in Section 6.
To illustrate the practicality of the system, we used the built-in symbolic trajectory evaluation procedure to fully verify a simple 32-bit microprocessor (an extended version of Tamarack III (Joyce, 1989; Zhu et al., 1993) ) and the pipelined integer unit of a 32-bit RISC architecture with a 32 registers deep register le (the circuit is a switch-level implementation of the McMillan datapath described in (Burch et al., 1992) ). The circuits veri ed contained around 16 000 transistors each and the veri cation processes required less than 45 minutes on a Sparc 10/51 processor with 64Mbyte of memory.
Although circuits as large as 20 000 transistors modelled at the switch-level and as complex as pipelined integer RISC cores have been veri ed, it is clear that other methods are needed if circuits with several order of magnitude more transistors are to be veri ed. One method to accomplish is the topic of the next section.
Inference Rules
The previous section presented the theory of trajectory evaluation, and showed how properties of a circuit could be veri ed. Theorem 3.3 is the key result: from C v A , we can infer j = M A== C]. In this section, we develop other rules for inferring these results, enabling the re-use and composition of old results, and the incorporation of domain knowledge.
Throughout the section we shall use the circuit shown in Fig. 5 as a simple example (our new techniques are not needed for such a simple circuit, but it illustrates the theory).
Preliminary theory
Before we can introduce the theorems needed for combining veri cation results, some technical results will be needed.
The rst technical lemma says that a de ning sequence is less than the corresponding de ning trajectory. The second lemma says that a de ning sequence of a formula A is less than a de ning trajectory of a formula C if and only if the de ning trajectory of A is less than the de ning trajectory of C. This result will be used when nding the equivalent of transitivity for veri cation results. 
Identity Inference Rule
Our rst general theorem is almost trivial. However, it is useful in a number of places. 
Time Shift Inference Rule
The following results allow us to move the \base time" of a result. In essence, the nal result says that if we can prove an assertion with all times relative to time zero, then the same result holds with all the times relative to some time t. Proof: Follows trivially from Lemma 4.5 by induction on t.
As an example of using this theorem, consider the circuit shown in But it is not true that j = M D is 0== N(E is 0)], since nothing is known about the value of node C at time zero.
Post-condition weakening and pre-condition strengthening
The following theorem is a direct equivalent of the classical post-condition weakening and precondition strengthening in Hoare logic. 
Conjunction rule
The following theorem is particularly useful when properties about separate parts of the system have been proven and we now want to combine these results to reason about the combined part. Combining these two results using the conjunction rule gives 
Specialisation Inference Rule
Specialisation is a rule which allows the generation from a general form of a trajectory assertion more specialised versions. For example from M is a == O is 2*a] we may wish to generate M is 1 == O is 2*1] or M is a+b == O is 2*(a+b)]. There are two types of specialisation | a simple substitution, and a more general specialisation. We discuss each in turn. It should be remembered that symbolic trajectory assertions are universally quanti ed by the free Boolean variables which appear in them. Usually, it is convenient to omit the quanti cation; however, when discussing substitutions, explicitly quantifying the assertion makes the dependencies clearer.
4.7.1 Simple substitution De nition 4.1 A simple substitution is a function from a set of variables,Ĩ, to expressions over constants and these variables, EĨ. . We can prove using Voss that j = M T 1 and j = M T 2 . Suppose we want to \modify" T 2 so that we can use transitivity between T 1 and T 2 . Any single substitution here into T 2 will lose us information so that the substituted version of T 2 will not be of help.
A specialisation gives more ne-grained control over the modi cation of a trajectory assertion.
De nition 4.3 Let^ = (g 1 ; 1 ); : : :; (g n ; n )], where each g i a Boolean expression, and each i is a substitution. If C is a trajectory formula then de ne^ (C) =^n 1 (g i ! i (C)).
A specialisation is a list of pairs, each pair consisting of a boolean expression (the guard) and a simple substitution. To use the specialisation, for each guard-substitution pair, we use the substitution, and then qualify the antecedent and consequent of the trajectory assertion by restricting the domain of all variables to when the guard is true. To obtain the specialised assertion, all such quali ed substitutions are conjoined. In this example, the specialisation (a; (b; 0)]); (:a; (b; 1)])] could be used to specialise T 2 , and we would obtain the convenient result 
Overview
In this section, we have completed the proof of the inference rules which our theorem prover described in section 6 uses. The basic rules of inference are:
1. VOSS: Given a trajectory assertion, use symbolic trajectory evaluation to show that it is valid. 2. Time-shifting 3. Transitivity 4. Post-condition weakening 5. Pre-condition strengthening 6. Specialisation 7. Conjunction The soundness of rule 1 was shown in section 3, and the soundness of the remaining rules were shown in this section.
For a practical tool, we need something more. For example, we may have j = M A== B] and j = M C== D]. To derive a useful result, we may need to time-shift the former, specialise the latter, and use transitivity. While being able to manually specify the specialisations and time-shifting is important, for a useful tool we would like as much of this to be done automatically. Although complete automation is not possible, we have made progress in this regard. The theorem prover therefore provides additional rules of inference which use the basic ones as steps. The soundness of these compound rules follows from the soundness of the basic rules.
Boolean and other domains
While in principle the theory of symbolic trajectory evaluation can be extended to any domain, in practice symbolic trajectory evaluation is applied to more limited domains. In the Voss system, the underlying domain is a quaternary system f0; 1; >; ?g, and the lattice for the state space is an appropriate cross-product of this lattice.
This can make specifying the behaviour of systems tedious and error-prone: it becomes di cult to see that the formulas written down accurately represent our intuitive understanding of the system. For example, to verify a circuit which adds two numbers together, the speci cation must be given in terms of the signals which di erent bits in the circuit have, rather than in terms of integers being added together.
Further, BDDs are the sole means of checking properties. In practice, this is a signi cant problem. In proving properties, it is not uncommon to need domain-speci c properties such as the commutativity of integer multiplication (i.e. is xy = yx, where x and y are integers?). This example is a simple result, but cannot be checked using BDDs due to the inherent limitations of BDDs.
Therefore there are two reasons to raise the level of abstraction: to make the speci cation of properties easier and more understandable; and to use domain-speci c knowledge in proofs. Two possible ways of raising the level of abstraction are presented below.
Node/value mapping
The solution we have adopted is to provide library routines which simplify the process of speci cation. Speci cation is still at the bit-level, but the library routines provide a higher-level interface to do this. For example instead of saying:
we can write N ISINT a There are two issues. First, there is a need to refer to elements of the circuit being veri ed. Instead of referring individually to members of a group of nodes, we may nd it convenient to name them as a group, and thus view the system at a more abstract level. Or, it may be appropriate to refer to nodes with more meaningful names. Thus, the rst part of mapping is to map a logical node name to a physical node or a vector of physical nodes. The user of the system must do this by providing the mapping from logical to physical names. This part of the mapping is purely syntactic sugar, and it is important for the veri er to realise that the veri cation really is in terms of the physical nodes, not the logical nodes.
The drawback of this syntactic mapping is that the user of the system must clearly understand what the physical level of the system looks like, and how the translation works. The user must give the mapping from each integer node to the b boolean nodes which represent it, and so on. The library routines do not hide the complexity of the underlying circuit, rather they provide a way in which the complexity can be managed. Whatever the appearance that the library routines and pretty-printing gives, it needs to be emphasised that all speci cations and all symbolic trajectory evaluation results are in terms of the state of the physical nodes.
The second issue is being able to refer to values in terms of concepts such as Booleans and integers, rather than as bits or bit-vectors. To do this, we need a proper semantic mapping between the values we represent at the \higher" level, and their meaning given by bits or bit-vectors. This semantics is given by a mapping routine. Using this mapping, it is possible to specify values in a more abstract way, and incorporate domain-knowledge into the system in a exible yet rigorous way.
In the HOL-Voss system it was shown how the HOL theorem prover could be linked to the Voss system in a rigorous way. There, a set of library routines was formally proven to be correct. For example, we can be sure that bv(x + y) = bv(x) add bv(y), where bv is the library routine which translates from integers into bit-vectors, and add is addition de ned on bit-vectors.
Knowing this (and similar properties of bv) allows us to use properties of integers (proven in HOL) without having to construct the bit-vectors for the expressions. The proof of the correctness of bv assures us that given an equation proven true in HOL, were we to construct BDDs for both sides of the equation, the two BDDs would be the same.
Similarly, in the present system we have a mapping function which gives the semantics of integer and boolean expressions in terms of bits and bit-vectors (although we have not gone through the exercise of performing a mechanically checked correctness proof as was done in HOL-Voss). Domain knowledge is provided by a simple integer theorem-prover and decision procedures for integers. This results in a sound, practical method for expressing integer and boolean values, and using domain knowledge e ectively. We explore the strengths and weaknesses of this approach in the conclusion.
The following example illustrates the advantage of this approach N ISINT a*b;
Instead of referring to a number of bit-level nodes individually, we can refer to them as a group. Multiplication is not possible to represent e ciently using BDDs. Here we have a practical way of doing the representation which is sound in principle. We can use domain knowledge (for example properties of natural numbers) in our proofs. Examples will be seen later.
Mapping between domains
The second approach to raising the level of abstraction is to allow mapping between domains. Speci cation is done in one domain, and veri cation in another. Abstraction occurs when details present in the one domain are not present in the other. Abstraction is an important tool in making veri cation more e cient, and there have been a number of proposals for doing so (Donat, 1993; Long, 1993; McIsaac, 1993) . There is an important distinction: we are proposing abstraction as a way to make veri cation pleasanter for the veri er, rather than more e cient.
In terms of the work we present in this paper there is no clear advantage in performing domain mapping over performing the simpler mapping. There are a number of open issues in how this form of abstraction can be speci ed, used, and automated. In general, we believe that besides performance bene ts discussed elsewhere (Long, 1993; McIsaac, 1993) , this may lead to more secure systems since the proofs will be done in domains closer to users' intuitive understanding of systems.
Practical Tool
The theory described in the preceding two sections has been implemented, and integrated with Voss into a new system. This tool is a theorem prover with which a user can prove properties of circuits speci ed either in VHDL or netlist form. The veri cation proof is an FL program which uses the theorem prover at each step. The ability to use FL as a script language gives great versatility and power.
In this section we describe the inference rules which the theorem prover provides. There are a number of small examples. More extensive examples are given in the next section.
We use the term \trajectory assertion" to denote any claim made about the circuit, and the term \theorem" to denote a claim which has been proven valid by using the rules of inference.
Use of tool
FL is used as the script language for proofs. The system has de ned abstract data types for representing and manipulating trajectories and the appropriate values (like integers).
Trajectory assertions are expressed as an abstract data type using the syntax below. DIV2 x n represents x=2 n . BWID n x represents the n lower order bits of x, viz. x mod 2 n . POW2 n is 2 n . BIT2 n x is the n-th bit of x, viz. (x mod 2 n )=2 n?1 .
Trajectory assertions are of the form:
AssertionPair ::= Trajectory ==>> Trajectory;
Using this syntax, we can represent trajectories and trajectory assertions. The trajectory assertions can be veri ed and generated using only using the inference rules described below. This style of system is copied from the later LCF systems, where ML was the meta-language for interacting with the system (Paulson, 1987) . In HOL (which grew out of LCF, and uses ML too), only HOL's inference rules can be used to generate theorems, but the ML program is used to order and combine the proof steps (Gordon, 1987; Gordon, 1993) .
The inference rules return objects of type Theorem. Besides the inference rules, only PrThm (pretty printing) can manipulate these objects. This limitation guarantees the soundness of the results; by restricting the operations allowed on this type of object, we can ensure that the system is safe, while still having the power and exibility of a fully-programmable script language.
Abstraction is promoted by allowing the speci cation to be given either in terms of integers or Booleans, and allowing the user to specify a correspondence between logical and physical nodes. To incorporate domain knowledge, the user can provide a theory which is a list of properties about integers. Each property is given as a pair of expressions, such a pair stating that the two expressions are equal. Properties can be proven using a special-purpose integer theorem-prover built for this tool. Domain knowledge is also supported through a set of simple normalisation routines which try to keep integer and boolean expressions in a close to canonical form. The system can use the domain information in two ways. Where the normalisation is successfully done, comparison two expressions can be done by simply performing a syntactic check between the two expressions. Where that fails each property is used in turn by matching the pair of expressions in the property with the pair of expressions we wish to compare. If these matchings succeed then a positive answer can be given, otherwise the comparison fails.
An issue beyond the scope of the paper is the comparison (in the information ordering) of trajectories. Since BDDs are no longer used to represent trajectories, other algorithms were developed to compare trajectories.
Primitive inference rules
The primitive inference rules are implementations of the inference rules described in Section 3. The implementation of these rules, together with basic routines such as trajectory comparison, form the core of the system, the trusted part of the system.
The Identity rule Form of rule: IDENTITY trajectory
This rule takes a trajectory, T and returns the theorem T== T].
The Voss inference rule
Form of rule: VOSS varmap (Ant, Con) This rule takes a trajectory assertion (an antecedent, consequent pair), and veri es this assertion by using Voss to check that the circuit is consistent with this assertion. The antecedent and consequent must be translated into Voss format. This implies that integer expressions must be encoded as bit vectors. varmap speci es the relationship between the domain variables in the antecedent and consequent and the underlying bit-vector variables used in the encoding. This mapping is needed because the performance of BDD-based approaches depends on the variable ordering used. The mapping is checked automatically for consistency, so the correctness of the rule is not a ected if a wrong ordering is given, although the performance may su er. 4 One of the big advantages of breaking down the proof into di erent parts is that the appropriate variable orderings can be used for each part. Where the entire circuit is veri ed as a whole, it is sometimes di cult or impossible to nd a variable ordering which allows e cient veri cation.
Time shifting
Form of rule: SHIFT Base t This takes a valid theorem, and a non-negative integer t, and derives a new rule using the time shift inference rule.
For example to derive the assertion: N ISINT a FROM 10 TO 20 == M ISINT 2*a FROM 20 TO 30], the following code could be used. 
Specialisation
Form of rule: SPECIAL Theorem subfn This takes a theorem and a specialisation, and returns the theorem, specialised.
A specialisation is a list of quali ed substitutions. A quali ed substitution is a pair consisting of a boolean expression which speci es when the substitution is valid, and a simple substitution. A simple substitution is pair consisting of a substitution list for Booleans and a substitution list for integers. A substitution list is a list of variable name, expression pairs which shows for each variable what expression should be substituted for it.
As an example of where specialisation may be useful, consider a system comprising a selector and an inverter. We can prove
about the selector, and we can prove
about the inverter. We would like to put these two results together, but cannot in the present form. 
Then using conjunction, we get
which is what we want If we show for each i = 3; : : :; n that 8V: A i+1 ( i+1 (V )) v lub( C i ( i (V )) ; A i ( i (V )) ), then we shall have using transitivity that 8V: j = M A(V )== C n ( n (V ))]. Finally using post-condition weakening, if 8V: C(V ) v Cn( n(V )) , then we shall have 8V: j = M A(V )== C(V )]. Therefore, to conclude this, we have to nd substitutions 1 ; : : :; n for which the speci ed relationships hold.
Putting this all together formally we need to test whether, B holds, where B = 9 1 ; : : :; n : B 0 can be checked automatically using BDDs. It can be encoded as an FL fragment using the existential quanti ers. Executing this fragment then determines whether the substitutions exist or not. The existence of the substitutions implies that A== C] is a valid theorem. This does not tell us what the substitutions are, but we do not have to know what the substitutions are to know whether the result is valid. This is a pleasing result in that it shows the power of BDDs. It is also a powerful result, since it is not limited by the same constraints as the SPTRANS rule below is. However, it is likely to be very expensive in practice, particularly for non-boolean domains.
Additional inference rules
The rules described so far are all that are strictly necessary to implement the rules described in chapter 4. However, to be really useful, they should be packaged in some way. Suppose we have j = M A 1 == C 1 ] and j = M A 2 == C 2 ]. Now it may be that before being able to use transitivity to deduce that j = M A 1 == C 2 ] that either the rst or the second trajectory assertion needs to be time-shifted. Or, the second trajectory assertion may need to be specialised. The rules described before allow the user to specify the necessary time-shifting and/or specialisation. However, it would be better for the system to be able to derive these changes automatically. This is what the rules below do. These rules are not core rules in that the soundness of the results does not rely on their correct implementation. All these rules use the primitive rules to perform inference. Their utility is that they are packaged with heuristics which \guess" appropriate specialisations etc. If these heuristics are incorrect, or not powerful enough, it may not be possible to prove results which are true; it will not be possible to prove false results. This rule takes a theory, and two theorems j = M A 1 == C 1 ] and j = M A 2 == C 2 ]. It then tries to derive a specialisation^ such that^ (A 2 ) v lub( A 1 ; C 1 ), and if successful it returns j = M A 1 == ^ (C 2 )]. Unlike AUTOSPTRANS, SPTRANS is not a direct implementation of the theory from Section 4; rather it uses TRANS and SPEC for inferences.
A description of the algorithm used to derive the specialisation is beyond the scope of the paper, but essentially, it matches the antecedent of the second theorem against the consequent of the second. The process is analogous to uni cation. The example given in Section 6.2.7 illustrates why we wish to do this. This rule is the combination of the TRANS and SPEC rules, packaged with a heuristic to nd the appropriate specialisation.
A simple example is given here, and a more complicated one in the next section. This rule takes a theory, and two valid theorems j = M A 1 == C 1 ] and j = M A 2 == C 2 ]. Using the theory, the rule determines whether there exists a suitable time shift for the second theorem so that transitivity can be used between the two theorems. Recall that theorems can only be shifted forward in time. So, if the algorithm returns a negative time-shift, we cannot shift the second theorem backwards in time; rather we must shift the rst theorem forwards in time. Formally, the rule seeks an integer t such that N t A 2 v C 1 . If such a t exists, then j = M A 1 == N t C 2 ] (or j = M N ?t A 1 == C 2 ] if t is negative) is returned as a valid theorem. Note that the remark after Theorem 4.6 explains why we have to treat the cases of t being positive and negative as separate cases: while forward-shifting a theorem yields a valid theorem, backward shifting does not necessarily do so. A description of the algorithm that nds the time-shift is beyond the scope of this paper.
This rule will nd a time-shift if it exists, subject to the limitations of the domain knowledge given in the theory.
Combined time-aligning and specialising

Form of rule: ALIGNSUB theory Theorem1 Theorem2
This rule takes a theory, and two theorems, j = M A 1 == C 1 ] and j = M A 2 == C 2 ]. The rule then attempts to nd a time shift t and a specialisation^ such that j = M A 1 == ^ (N t C 2 )], if t 0, or j = M N ?t A 1 == ^ (C 2 )], if t < 0.
In general, for a given pair of theorems there could be a number of di erent time-shifts and specialisations which could be used to combine the theorems. To enumerate all the possibilities would be too computationally expensive, therefore a simple approach is taken. The rst step is to guess a time-shift which might be suitable. This is done based on examining when nodes are de ned, but ignoring how they are de ned. Depending on whether the time-shift is negative or positive, the appropriate theorem is time-shifted. Although we cannot be sure that the time-shifted theorem will be useful in the next step, the time-shifted theorem is valid. The next step is to apply the SPTRANS rule to try to nd an appropriate specialisation. This implies that the ALIGNSUB rule is safe, since if the SPTRANS rule nds an appropriate specialisation, a valid theorem will be returned, and if it cannot, no theorem will returned.
Examples
The rst three examples are contrived examples to show the use of some of the inference rules. The fourth example shows the complete veri cation of a 64-bit multiplier.
Simple example 1
The rst example illustrates the use of the SPTRANS rule, allowing the two trajectory assertions to be composed by appropriately specialising the second assertion, and then using transitivity. For the rst example, consider the circuit shown in Fig. 6 . The overall purpose of the circuit is to take in three numbers x, y and z on nodes A, B and C, and produce z + max(x; y) on F. There are three parts to the circuit. The rst part compares the value on A with the value on B and produces true on D if the number at A is bigger than the number on B and produces false otherwise. The second part of the circuit takes the values at A, B and D and produces at node E the value at A if D is set to true, and produces B otherwise. The third part of the circuit takes the values at node E and C, adds them together, and produces the sum at node F. The proof script is below.
The theorem T1 is the proof that the comparator part of the circuit works. The theorem T2 is the proof that the selector part of the circuit works. The theorem T3 is the proof that the adder part of the circuit works. The proof of the correctness of the entire circuit contains two steps. First we use SPTRANS using T1 and T2. This results in specialising T2 (substitute i j for a) and then using transitivity to generate G1. SPTRANS is then used again, combining G1 and T2. The specialisation used on T3 is ( ("k"; i)]; i > j); ( ("k"; j)]; Not(i > j))]. This shows quite nicely the power of general specialisation. Essentially it allows the proof of two cases to be done in one step. Note that the veri cation of each component is done in the presence of the rest of the system, which means that any unintended interference can be detected. By considering the state of the rest of the system as unknown (i.e. having the nodes set to X) we can perform the component veri cation e ciently and still be sure that no matter what the rest of the system does we shall obtain the desired behaviour. This is a very useful property, since much of the work involved in other compositional approaches goes into ensuring that each component works correctly in all environments.
Simple example 2 { hidden weighted bit
The hidden weighted bit problem was one of the rst to be proven to need exponential space to verify using traditional BDD-based methods (Bryant, 1991) . A circuit for an 8-bit version is shown in Figure 7 .
In this version, the global input x 1 ; : : :; x n is copied to two bu ers. The Counter part of the circuit computes the number of 1's on the input (i.e. because the output value on CountNode, in terms of the boolean variables, is so complicated that no suitable variable ordering can be found so that the Chooser part of the circuit can be veri ed e ciently. The virtue of the the compositional approach is clearly illustrated: by decoupling the veri cation of the two parts of the circuit, we can choose suitable variable orderings for both parts of the circuit; moreover, it is more e cient to verify the circuit for an arbitrary input j (which only needs very simple BDDs to represent it), and then substitute for j the actual input, than to verify for the actual input (which needs more complicated BDDs to represent it).
The proof script is given below. There are ve steps in the proof. The proof the copying of the input to the bu er is correct | Bu erTheorem. Results: We veri ed the circuit for di erent values of n (4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128) . For these values, veri cation takes roughly cubic time (and importantly, space was not an issue). The veri cation of the 128 bit problem took just under 27 minutes. Compared to this, veri cation of the system as one unit was not possible for n = 64 or larger. This example shows o the AUTOSPTRANS rule. Consider the circuit shown in Fig. 8 . Assume that the circuit we are verifying consists of two parts. We prove of the rst part (using Voss) that if N has the value a, and M has the value b then O produces the value a _ b. We prove of the second part that if O takes the value :(c^f) then P produces the value c^f. Our overall goal is to show that if N has the value a, and M has the value b then P produces :(a _ b). The AUTOSPTRANS rule can be used to combine the primitive results. The existential quanti cation described in the previous section computes that there is indeed an appropriate substitution (in this case :a for c, and :b for f. Note also that the BDDs cope very well with di erent syntactic expressions for the same semantic object. The proof is expressed as follows: 
Verifying a multiplication circuit
Properties concerning multiplication cannot be veri ed using BDD based tools alone, since the representation of multiplication by BDDs needs exponentially sized BDDs (Bryant, 1991) . In this example we show how a multiplication circuit can be veri ed using our tool. The key to the proof is to recognise that after the i-th stage, the result computed by the circuit is y multiplied by the i lower order bits of x. Suppose that at the end of the i-th stage we have proven that given the initial input for the circuit, the output of the i-th stage is indeed the i lower order bits of x multiplied by y. At the (i + 1)-st step we do three things.
Firstly, the local property of the stage is checked { that it actually does the addition and so on. This proof is done using Voss, and, crucially for the e ciency of the checking, is done for arbitrary input values rather than the actual values the circuit will use when executing. Once this check has been done, we compose this result with the result from the i-th stage. Secondly, applying the ALIGNSUB rule (time alignment and specialisation for the new result, and composition of the i-th stage result with the transformed new result), we get what the (i + 1)-st stage's output is in terms of the whole circuit's input. Finally, the consequent of this theorem is not quite in the form we want, and we use post-condition weakening to obtain that at the end of the (i + 1)-st stage the partial result computed is the (i + 1) lower order bits of x multiplied by y. This step is then repeated for i = 1; : : :; n. To start o the process, we prove a simple theorem which just states that the input remains constant.
The proof script is given in the appendix. Here we work through a few steps of an eight bit multiplier to illustrate the proof. Assume that the circuit takes two integers on integer node A and integer node B. Each of these nodes is represented in the underlying circuit by 8 boolean nodes
Prove the trivial theorem that if A has the value x and B has the value y, and Ground has the value zero over a certain time interval then A has the value x and B has the value y, and Ground has the value zero over the same time interval. We cannot use transitivity on T 0 and T 1 because they use di erent variables to describe the value of the nodes. However, if we specialised T 1 we would get the antecedent of T 1 being less than the consequent of T 0 . So we use the ALIGNSUB rule to do this Note how 0 is substituted for k. This is almost in the form that we want. The only problem is that in general, the i-th bit of x is not the same as the rst i bits of x, and as this is going to be in a loop of the FL program constituting the proof, we use post-condition weakening to get, T 3 :
|-B is (y from 0 to 1000)] A is (x from 0 to 1000)] TC0 is (0 from 0 to 1000)] ==>> TC1 is ((y*(x 1..1])) from 24 to 1000)]
In order to do this post-condition weakening, it had to be shown that y x 1] = y x 1::1].
This can easily be done in the simple integer prover provided. The rule initrule is supplied to the POSTWEAK procedure. We have now proven the correctness of the rst stage. The rst step in the second stage is to prove the correctness of the circuitry of the stage. We The second step is to combine T 3 and T 4 using ALIGNSUB. T 4 must be shifted 24 time units, and x, y and (y*(x 1..1])) must be substituted for i, j and k. Doing this we obtain: We want as an invariant after each step that:
TCn is y*x 1..n]
Using post-condition weakening fails at rst since the system needs to know that y x 1::1] + 2 1 y 1::7] x 2] = y x 1::2]. This is beyond the ability of our simple integer theorem prover to prove. Thus we give the system the general assumption :
let mulrule = Assume (((y '* (BWID n x)) '+ (POW2 n) '* (BWID ('bit_width '-n) y) '* (BIT2 (n '+ '1) x)), (y '* (BWID (n '+ '1) x)));
(note the substitution of n for 1 in appropriate places, so 1 becomes n, 2 becomes n + 1, and 7 becomes bit width ? n). Now use POSTWEAK to obtain: Note that any assumptions which are used are made explicit. We now repeat this process for each stage in the multiplier. The nal stage (which we do not show for space reasons) is to use post-condition weakening to derive the nal result. Assuming eight-bit integers, we get as the nal result 
Results
By proving the properties of each stage of the circuit separately and using the rules of combination a number of advantages are gained. Firstly, since we are still using Voss for the low-level proof we keep the advantages of trajectory evaluation. Secondly, since we prove the partial results for arbitrary inputs rather that complicated speci c cases, we can avoid the exponential growth of BDDs and thereby make the method tractable. All time-shifting and specialisations are derived automatically, simplifying the task of the user.
This process veri es the entire circuit, including ensuring that di erent parts of the circuit are correctly connected.
The veri cation of a 64-bit multiplier took just less than fourteen CPU minutes on a Sun Sparc 10/51 processor. The performance is roughly quadratic in the bit-width, so this problem can easily be dealt with.
It is di cult to estimate the amount of human e ort involved in the proof, since the proof went hand-in-hand with system development (and circuit debugging!). It turned out that one of the most di cult parts of the veri cation was getting the timing constraints correct. Our estimate is that the proof itself took two days to get right.
Conclusion
Summary
We have proposed a theorem-prover based on symbolic trajectory evaluation and OBDDs. Combining these two methods of veri cation has resulted in a powerful theory and tool for low-level hardware veri cation and the combination of results. In our largest example, we veri ed the correctness of a 64-bit multiplier (a circuit consisting on the order of twenty-ve thousand gates) using approximately fteen minutes of CPU time.
This was obtained by exploiting the strengths of Voss, and providing (i) a means of overcoming its weaknesses, and (ii) a method for proof management.
The strength of Voss is that it allows the use of symbolic trajectory evaluation to verify low-level properties of circuits very e ciently. With Voss, we also have an accurate model of the circuit, including timing.
A weakness of Voss is that it relies on one rule for obtaining symbolic trajectory evaluation results. It proves results of the form j = M A== B] by checking whether B v A . The combined task of computing and comparing trajectories can be very expensive (in general the problem is NP-hard). We have developed a theory and inference system which allows us to infer that B v A without computing A . In the theorem prover implementing this inference system and providing a powerful and exible proof management system, a key issue is the use of domain knowledge. For example, when proving properties of circuits which manipulate integers, using properties of integers obviates the need for representing everything using OBDDs, making the analysis of a large class of circuits tractable. Although the tool also allows re-use of results, the examples did not show this o to its best advantage. In the multiplication example, instead of constructing it out of sixty-four stages, we could have implemented the multiplier in one stage, with the output being fed back into the input { slightly more complicated circuitry but not too di erent. In this case we could use Voss once to prove how it worked, and then use the time-shift rule 63 times. As the time-shift rule is one to two orders of magnitude faster than trajectory evaluation this would result in signi cant saving.
We believe that we have shown:
The use of hybrid methods gives us exibility and power without losing rigour. The use of domain knowledge is very important in gaining e ciency. Composition of results is important: whether we have proved results of di erent parts of the circuit, or want to combine smaller results of the same part of the circuit, or re-use results, composition is a very powerful technique. Veri cation is made easier to understand, and, for reasons discussed earlier, much more e cient. In particular, symbolic trajectory evaluation results can be composed. This enables the derivation of symbolic trajectory evaluation results without having to explicitly perform the trajectory evaluation.
Problems and extensions
Integrating domain knowledge
For the purposes of the work done so far, which we see as a proto-type for further work, we implemented a fairly ad hoc approach to incorporating domain knowledge. We implemented a simple theorem prover to make arguments about integers, and used simple decision procedures to keep integer expressions in some sort of normalised form. We saw the limitations of this. Firstly, the prover was not very powerful. Secondly, the interplay between the simple decision procedures and the theorem prover made the use of the system a bit clumsy in parts, due to the ad hoc nature of the approach. Finally, the security of an ad hoc approach must be questionable. Therefore it is essential that there be a proper interface to a proper theorem prover in which arguments about domain knowledge can be made (a very important case is arguments about integers). Theorem-provers with appropriate libraries (like HOL), or decision procedures or reasoning tools for integers like PVS (Owre et al., 1992) and Analytica (Clarke & Zhao, 1992) would be appropriate; criteria for choice include expertise of intended user, desired level of exibility and security, and domain of application.
Arguments about the combination of theories may also need to be made. We need to explore work such as (Shostak, 1979; Shostak, 1984) to see how this can be done in a coherent way so as to make integrating new theories easy and rigorous.
Soundness of methods
While in principle we have a sound theory, the implementation has a number of weaknesses. The ad hoc implementation of the integer theorem prover is one hole. Another problem is that although we have separated out the trusted and non-trusted parts of the system, there is a fairly large, trusted core. Let A be a set of trajectory assertions. Consider the class U of machines which satisfy all these assertions. A number of interesting theoretical questions arise: Does there exist a unique \weakest" machine in U? Suppose for each M 2 U; j = M A; A 6 2 A. Can A be inferred from A using the inference rules above? These are questions for future research.
Completeness of rules
Structural versus behavioural
One of the properties of symbolic trajectory evaluation is that veri cation is behavioural rather than structural. We move away from a purely behavioural model in two ways. Our model of the system is entirely behavioural. However, it is important for the usefulness of our system that su cient meaningful structure be identi able (there's nothing stopping the treating of any arbitrary eight binary nodes as an 8-bit integer; however, unless this corresponds to reality, this is unlikely to be very useful). Second, structural composition of the speci cation is a fundamental part of e cient proof management. This issue needs to be explored further to improve performance and allow composition of circuits.
False implies everything
In logic, false being in the protasis of an implication makes the implication true trivially. Theorems of the form if pigs have wings, then this circuit works, while logically valid are problematic since they may lull veri ers into a false sense of security. In Voss this problem manifests itself when top appears in the antecedent of a trajectory assertion. Thus in theory, nonsense theorems are possible. However, Voss checks whether there is at least one valid trajectory. In this tool, by moving away from the Voss representation, we lose this automatic checking of security. Furthermore, some of the inference rules admit the possibility of obtaining inconsistent antecedents (obvious cases being the conjunction and and time-shift rules, and specialisation). While mathematically this does not pose a problem, as a practical tool, we want any speci cation which has such an inconsistency to be rejected as it will indicate an error in the speci cation.
There are two factors which reduce the seriousness of the problem. Firstly, the greatest danger of such nonsense theorems is that they become buried | they get used in the middle of a proof and the nal result does not re ect this. This does not occur here. If at any stage, we obtain an inconsistent antecedent, if that theorem is used by any combination rule, then the resulting theorem must also have an inconsistent antecedent. This means that in such a case, the nal result of a proof would have such an inconsistency explicit in its antecedent. Second, in practice, the antecedent of a theorem is likely to be of a simple enough form that a BDD-representation would be reasonably e cient to obtain. This being the case, it may be reasonably e cient to allow the user to check a nal result for consistency. This needs further research.
Heuristics and User-assistance
The usefulness of a tool like this depends in a large measure on the ease of use and assistance given to a user. The heuristics used to nd appropriate time-shifts and specialisations are very important here. Although the heuristics performed well in the examples which we have used, an issue for further research is how these heuristics can be improved, and nding other heuristics or other kinds of assistance which could be provided. As an example, we found timing to be one of the most di cult aspects of getting the veri cation right | assistance here would be very valuable. There are also a range of user-interface issues which could be explored to make the use of such a tool pleasanter.
A Multiplication example
This section contains the proof of the veri cation of the 64-bit multiplication example shown in section 7. The multiplication circuit itself was generated by a VHDL program and consists of the order of twenty-ve thousand gates. The FL program which veri es the circuit is shown below. // GENERAL STEP------------------------------------------------// This is the proof that the n-th stage in the multiplier works // correctly // Timing considerations --each successive stage has the // signal for less time let answer_delay = 3*bit_width; let start_stage n = n*answer_delay; let signal_len n = signal_length-n*answer_delay; let stage n = let Ainp= "A" in let Binp= "B" in let Cinp= "TC"^(num2str n) in let Cout= "TC"^(num2str (n+1)) in let nplusone = '(n+1) in let jpart = BWID ('(bit_width -n)) j in ((( Ainp ISINT i) _&_ ( Binp ISINT j) _&_ ( Cinp ISINT k)) FROM 0 TO signal_len n) ==>> (Cout ISINT (k '+ (jpart '* ((BIT2 nplusone i) '* (POW2 ('n)) ))) FROM answer_delay TO signal_len n); let multhm n = VOSS (varmap n) (stage n);
// Wish to show that the partial result computed from the // composition of stages 1..n is correct let induc n = let n1 = n+1 in let n2 = int2str n1 in let Ainp="A" in let Bout= "B" in let Cout= "TC"^n2 in let this_width = bit_width -n1 in Cout ISINT ((BWID ('n1) x) '* y) FROM start_stage n+answer_delay TO signal_length;
// Each step in the proof: // 1. prove the n-th stage works // 2. use ALIGNSUB to compose (1) 
